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TRAVEL BAN

The New Travel Ban: Undermining the Immigration and Nationality Act
By Peter Margulies

Monday, September 25, 2017, 4:30 PM

On September 24, President Trump issued a proclamation replacing Executive Order (EO) 13780 that is currently before the Supreme Court
—albeit with oral argument cancelled pending briefs from both sides on whether the new proclamation renders the case moot. The
proclamation—which I’ll call the new travel ban—continues inde nitely some of the most onerous restrictions in EO 13780, including the
suspension of family-based immigration from several countries.
The new ban’s adverse impact on family reuni cation means that its inde nite duration undermines the structure and purpose of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), thereby exceeding the power that Congress delegated to the President in the statute. Although the
Supreme Court may nd that the challenge to the now-superseded revised EO is moot, the new ban makes it likely that the Trump
administration will nd itself before the Supreme Court again—and sooner rather than later.
As Marty Lederman describes, the order suspends the entry of both immigrants and some or all classes of nonimmigrants from Chad, Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen. The administration added Chad to the list and dropped Sudan, asserting that Chad is unable to
provide requisite data for adequate terrorist screening, while Sudan can. In addition, the new ban bars the entry of immigrants from
Somalia, subjects Iraqi nationals to heightened screening, and bars nonimmigrant entry of certain Venezuelan government of cials. To the
administration’s credit, the new ban does not cover students or refugees. (Like EO 13780, the new ban also exempts current visa-holders and
lawful permanent residents [LPRs].)
In restricting entry inde nitely for the groups mentioned above, including family-sponsored immigrants, the new ban cites a comprehensive
interagency process that addresses shortfalls that the Administration perceived in the provision of information by the countries listed above.
My prior in-depth analysis of EO 13780 suggested that a temporary entry pause was consistent with the INA, to address information de cits
in countries such as Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen that have been racked by armed con ict. However, the inde nite suspension of familysponsored and employment immigration from the countries listed in the new ban lacks the limiting principle of temporary duration that t
the previous policy into the INA’s detailed scheme.
In taking the drastic step of inde nite suspension, the new ban relies on a questionable distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants
that turns the INA on its head. For decades, family reuni cation has been a central goal of the INA, which removed national origin quotas
that had been in place for forty years. In the 1965 changes that created today’s INA, Congress sought to ease the pain of separation for close
family members separated from U.S. citizens and LPRs by national borders. (See pp. 297-98 of Jack Chin’s article here). Congress coupled
that stress on family reuni cation with a regime of vetting by consular of cials that the new ban acknowledged was “more extensive” than
the vetting accorded all applicants for nonimmigrant visas.
Targeting immigrant visa applicants seems incongruous with this backdrop of enhanced vetting. It’s true, as the new ban asserts, that LPRs
are “more dif cult to remove” than nonimmigrants, but that’s because Congress considered LPRs’ interests in remaining in the U.S. as
dovetailing with their ties to close relatives among citizens and other LPRs. The new ban exacerbates the problem of family separation that
Congress labored to resolve. Because of that harm to the statutory scheme, the proclamation exceeds the power that Congress delegated to
the president under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to prohibit entry of noncitizens.
The administration also gets no support from another provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B), which permits the secretary of state to
set “procedures” for visa issuance. The “procedures” provision would allow the government to additional information from visa applicants.
For example, the administration could have established tailored procedures that addressed potential information de cits by requiring more
explanation or documentation from visa applicants (as the administration has done on supplemental questionnaires for visa applicants).
Further information requirements, such as the disclosure of social media “handles” for some visa applicants, might be appropriate—if they
do not add up to a de facto inde nite ban on immigration from that particular countries.
However, the new ban crosses that line because it is so manifestly over-inclusive. Consider children under 15 years of age. Beyond a
disqualifying communicable disease, it’s dif cult to imagine that a young child could have engaged in conduct that renders him or her
inadmissible. But the new ban does not say that medical professionals are unavailable to make that determination. Instead, it throws out
the baby with the bathwater, covering any child applying for an immigrant visa.
The waiver system in the new ban does not remedy its clash with the INA. To obtain a waiver, a noncitizen from the affected countries must
show that:

1. denying entry would cause the noncitizen “undue hardship”;
2. entry would not pose a threat to the U.S.; and,
3. entry would be “in the national interest.”
The second criterion—demanding that the noncitizen show he or she is not a threat—reverses the INA’s stance. The INA says that the
burden to determine that a visa applicant constitutes a threat falls on a consular of cer. (Consular of cers may alternatively exclude an
applicant because of prior commission of a crime, traces of a communicable disease, inability to support him- or herself, etc., as described in
the discussion in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kerry v. Din.) Placing the onus on the visa applicant to show that he or she is not a threat
shifts a burden that Congress placed on the government. The rst and third criteria introduce elements that do not gure at all in visa
decisions under the INA. Congress knew how to require a showing of “hardship” under the statute. It has done so in several other
immigration provisions, such as the requirement that undocumented noncitizens applying for a remedy called “cancellation of removal”
show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a close family member who is a citizen or LPR. However, the INA does not require any
showing of hardship by ordinary visa applicants overseas. The possibility of a shortfall in information about some visa applicants does not
justify these unilateral changes to the INA’s carefully calibrated system of visa processing.
Similarly, the provisions in the new ban for review of its provisions every 180 days do not remedy its con ict with the INA. To be sure, some
review is better than none. However, the problem with the new ban is that it shifts the longstanding default admissions policy: What was
once a policy of admission absent an af rmative basis for exclusion is now exclusion absent a compelling case for admission. That shift will
solidify the impression of the U.S. as a less-than-welcoming nation. More to the point, the shift in the default upends the INA’s statutory
scheme; periodic review does not remedy that problem.
In contrast, a de facto permanent ban might well violate the INA’s prohibition on discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas (8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1)(A)). In suspending immigration from several countries without an end-date, the administration has embraced the dubious legal
and policy arguments for an inde nite ban.
The new proclamation also strives in vain to counter the charge that it constitutes a “Muslim ban” that violates the Establishment Clause.
To diversify the countries affected by the ban, the proclamation adds non-majority-Muslim North Korea and Venezuela. However, in Woody
Allen’s memorable line from Bananas, the inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela is a “travesty of a mockery of a sham.” Like Josh
Blackman, I have doubts about whether the dynamic realm of foreign affairs is a t subject for Establishment Clause scrutiny. That being
said, the inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does nothing to ease the concerns of those who argued that the original and revised
immigration EOs violated the Establishment Clause. Since North Korea does not allow its nationals to emigrate to the U.S. (or anywhere
else), the number of North Koreans affected by the new ban is virtually nil. Moreover, the impact on Venezuela is con ned to a small group
of government of cials. In other words, the effect on Muslims of the original and revised EOs continues largely unabated in the
proclamation, with few implications for non-Muslim majority countries beyond symbolism
Because of the new ban’s terms, the Supreme Court will most likely nd that the pending challenges to the revised EO are moot. The Court
has just canceled its scheduled October 10 argument on EO 13780 pending brie ng on the new ban’s relevance to the case. Challenges to the
new ban should emerge almost immediately. If the experience with the prior EOs is illustrative, the administration may nd itself back
before the Supreme Court in the spring of 2018. At that time, perhaps the Court will weigh in on the merits and protect the INA’s structure
from further incursions.
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